One notable predicament is the scarcity of personnel, particularly those proficient in the language necessary to comprehend Iranian experts and effectively relay their instructions to Russian-speaking staff. A newly established expansive drone production facility in Tatarstan, operating as an “Iranian franchise,” has encountered delays and complications. This facility’s objective is to manufacture 6,000 drones by the summer of 2025. However, progress has stagnated due to difficulties in sourcing crucial components, a shortage of skilled engineers, and subpar output quality, with 25% of Iran-supplied drone parts being either damaged or defective. Moreover, language barriers, labor shortages, and employee retention issues further compound the challenges. The employment practices employed by Russia to recruit and retain laborers from Central Asia and Africa for drone production ventures deviate starkly from generally accepted labor norms. Notably, Russia heavily relies on women from Tajikistan, a language kin to Farsi.

The drone assembly is transpiring within the Alabuga Special Economic Zone, situated in Yelabuga city near the Kama River, approximately 800 km east of Moscow and directly north of Kazakhstan. Iran contributes both components and specialists to this endeavor. Through domestic production augmentation, Russia aims to bolster its inventory of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) deployed on the frontlines of the conflict with Ukraine.

Historically, Iran primarily supplied Russia with Shahed-136 kamikaze drones, which contain a small payload of explosives that detonate upon impact with a target. However, the Shahed-136, characterized by its sluggish and noisy propeller-driven design, is relatively conspicuous and susceptible to interception.

Engineers are diligently working to modernize antiquated Iranian manufacturing techniques, leveraging Russian industrial expertise to achieve large-scale drone production beyond Tehran’s capabilities. Their focus extends to enhancing the drones themselves, potentially enabling coordinated strikes on targets through autonomous drone coordination.

Nonetheless, analysis by the Institute for Science and International Security, based in Washington, reveals that progress at the facility lags behind schedule by at least a month. According to these findings, while Iran-supplied drones are being assembled at the site, the Russians are primarily involved in manufacturing the drone casings, likely totaling no more than 300 units, thereby casting doubt on their ability to meet stipulated deadlines.

Media accounts suggest that the Russian-Iranian collaborative efforts at the Alabuga facility have encountered setbacks in the areas of drone project transfer, electronic component procurement, and production staff training.

One of the principal obstacles faced by the Alabuga facility is the paucity of adequately skilled personnel capable of bridging the linguistic and cultural gap between Iranian specialists and Russian-speaking workers. A solution to this challenge, as reported in July by Razvorot and Protokol, involves a state-sponsored Russian initiative aimed at recruiting young women from developing nations for positions at the facility. This includes enlisting African women for routine, less technical tasks, while more specialized roles are primarily filled by Tajik women who can effectively communicate with Iranian weapons engineers. Despite promised competitive remuneration and training, the working conditions at the new facility are exploitative and perilous, rendering staff retention a critical concern.

To address communication gaps, lower-level Central Asian staff at Alabuga have been dispatched to Iran due to their proficiency in a language akin to Farsi. Their role encompasses observing assembly procedures at Iranian production sites, facilitating communication for the rest of the team, and undergoing training to subsequently assemble drones in Russia. An incident during a delegation visit to Iran underscored the potential dangers they face. Moreover, Alabuga is striving to attract young talent to its assembly line through enticing advertisements promising prospective careers and subsidized housing.

Notably, challenges in military collaboration between Russia and Iran extend beyond this venture. Despite significant anticipation and publicity surrounding a deal between the Iranian regime and Moscow, recent Iranian media reports suggest that Russia will not supply Iran with the anticipated Su-35 aircraft. The reasons behind this aborted deal remain undisclosed by either country’s authorities.